ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Traditional encryption schemes provide rather coarse-grained access to encrypted data, because the receiver can get the message in its entirety if he possesses the right key or he can learn nothing without the secret key. Thus a new encryption scheme -functional encryption (FE), with much more fine-grained control, has been extensively studied. FE was introduced by Boneh, Sahai and Waters [13] . A FE scheme means one who owns SKf can decrypt the cipher of m to get the value of f(m). It requires that the user learns nothing other than f(m). There are two well-accepted security notions for FE: indistinguishable based security definition (IND-FE) and simulation based definition (SIM-FE) [13] . But the security can't satisfy people's needs because of the different modes of attack, here we consider selective opening attack.
Selective opening security had been first investigated to the traditional public key encryption field by Bellare, Hofheinz and Yilek [10] in 2009. In the public key encryption system, there are two kinds of selective opening attack (SOA). One is coin-revealing SOA (SOA-C), that is to say, if an adversary obtains a number of ciphertexts and then corrupts a subset of the senders, obtaining not only the corresponding messages but also the coins under which they were encrypted, then the unopened messages still remain privacy. The other is key-revealing SOA (SOA-K), which means if an adversary obtains a number of ciphertexts encrypted under different public keys, then the senders are asked to reveal a subset of the corresponding decryption keys, in this case it remains secure for the rest of the messages. Creating an encryption scheme secure against SOA has important practical meaning. Under the complex environment of cloud computing, distributed shares in a distributed file-system are allotted to different servers to perform a task, if a subset of the distributed servers are corrupted by an adversary who may get the encrypted messages as well as the randomness, then can messages under the other uncorrupted severs remain secure?
Achieving security against SOA is challenging but even so there has been some works to achieve the security goal ( [5] , [6] , [8] , [4] , [9] , [7] ). There are two flavors of definitions to capture security under selective opening attacks: simulation-based selective opening security (SIM-SO) and indistinguishability-based selective opening security (IND-SO) [5] . Because IND-SO security notion requires that the joint plaintext distribution should be conditionally effective re-sampled, which restricts SOA security to limited setting, so we just concern SIM-SO security. SO secure PKE scheme had been investigated by Bellare et al. [5] in 2009. Bellare showed that any lossy encryption is able to achieve SO security. Later on, several other SOA secure PKE schemes had been constructed ( [6] , [9] , [8] ). In 2011, with the development of IBE, Bellare, Waters and Yilek [11] introduced SOA to IBE. In IBE, ciphertexts and secret keys SKID are generated according to the corresponding target identity ID, only the right SKID can open the ciphertexts and an adversary can make many key queries using the ID (different from the challenge ID) as input. Later, Junzuo Lai et al. [12] proposed a concrete CCA2 secure SO-IBE scheme. However, almost known SO-IBE schemes utilize the technology of one-side public openability which means these schemes have to encrypt bit by bit which is comparatively inefficient, and it is challenging to construct a SOA secure IBE scheme which is not bitwise. FE schemes seems to be different from PKE or IBE, but it aims to keep the encrypted message secret even though the adversary can get some special information SKf. But if the adversary has more ability to open a part of the message and get the randomness used in the encryption, can the security of the unopened messages be kept? [13] and [15] proved that the simulation secure FE can not be achieved in the standard model. So in this paper, we focus on the construction of IND-FE and simulation-based secure against SOA
Related Works
With the development of indistinguishability obfuscation (io), many difficult cryptography tasks can be achieved. In 2013, [16] proposed a concrete construction of functional encryption for all circuits. In their scheme, the SKf is generated by using indistinguishability obfuscation, at the same time, it uses double encryption of the same message as the ciphertext and statistical simulation soundness NIZK ( SSS-NIZK ) to get well-formed ciphertexts. With the help of io, their scheme can hide important process (decryption and compution) in the SKf. In 2014, Sahai and Waters [3] introduced a new technique: puncture programs. They proposed an effective method to transform the private key encryption to the public key encryption and they designed a deniable encryption scheme which had opened for 16 years [2] . In deniable encryption, if a sender is forced to reveal to an adversary both his message and the randomness under encryption, he should be able to provide a fake randomness and a fake message that will make the adversary believe the ciphertext is encryption of the fake message.
Our Contributions
The contribution of this work consists of the following two steps. We first propose a new security model of functional encryption secure against selective opening attacks (including coins and private keys), which we call SO-FE, and then propose a concrete construction of SO-FE scheme for general function without random oracle. In view of the impossiblility result of the SIM-FE in the standard model and the limitation of the IND-SO, the security of our scheme is indistinguishable based secure FE and simulation based secure against SOA.
In our scheme, we combine the coin-revealing selective opening security and key-revealing selective opening security owing to the special property of KeyGen process of FE. Before, SOA-C and SOA-K are mentioned in different scenes, specially, SOA-K is only used in the multi-key encryption, the feature of FE can make sure the key query even though ciphertexts are encrypted under the same public key.
The SO-FE scheme can be applied to the special situation, such as SO-IBE scheme, SO-ABE scheme, SO-PE scheme. Thus using io, we can get many encryption schemes secure against selective opening attacks. So far there are only SO-IBE schemes (ABE or PE scheme secure against SOA haven't be proposed). Moreover, all known SO-IBE schemes are bitwise, while our scheme can encrypt the message with any bit.
Our Technique
There are two difficult challenges in achieving this goal. The first is the corrupt query of coins in SOA-C process: when the adversary chooses a set I and asks to open the corresponding messages and randomness, how can the simulator provide the eligible randomness which is indistinguishable from the real one. The second is key queries in SOA-K process -a feature of FE security formalizations since [13] , that allows the adversary to obtain the decryption key of any reasonable functionality f of his choice, but how to define reasonablity in SOA-based security model.
To solve the first problem, we adopt deniable encryption (DE, refer to section 2.2) which can output a fake random r 0 (satisfies DE make sure the simulator generates a fake randomness to coins match the opened ciphers and the opened messages.
To solve the second problem, we impose restrictions on the adversary's choice of functions that can be queried to the key generation. Here we define reasonable fun Intuition. We start by giving an overview of the main ideas behind our SOA definition. To convey the core ideas, it suffices to consider the simple case of X = m 1 ,m 2 ,f(m 1 ,m 2 ), (m i ∈ {0,1}). Suppose that the adversary queries secret keys for function f. Now, recall that the IND-security definition guarantees that an adversary cannot differentiate between encryption of x 0 and x 1 IND-security definition, in SOA security model, the above restricting of f is not enough since an adversary can learn part information of message by making corrupt query of I. What we want to emphasize is that the key query and the corrupt query influence each other. The query of keys can increase the knowledge of I; the corrupt query of I can make the adversary learn more about the message and can affect the choice of functionality f. In our scheme, we impose restrictions on the sequence of queries ( the key queries of f must be made after the corrupt query of I ) to remove the affect of the key queries, at the same time, on the KeyGen phase we limit the choice of f to remove the affect of the corrupt query on the basis of the opened messages in m[I], because an adversary may choose some special f in view of m[I] which can leak the information of unopened messages.
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To solve the first problem, we adopt deniable encryption (DE, refer to section 2.2) which can (satisfies DE Enc ( pk DE , m 0 , r 0 ) = C). The special property of DE can make sure the simulator generates a fake randomness to cheat the adversary that the opened coins match the opened ciphers and the opened messages.
To solve the second problem, we impose restrictions on the adversary's choice of functions that can be queried to the key generation. Here we define reasonable function.
Intuition. We start by giving an overview of the main ideas behind our SOA-based security definition. To convey the core ideas, it suffices to consider the simple case of X = {0,1}). Suppose that the adversary queries secret keys for function f. security definition guarantees that an adversary cannot differentiate as long as f(x 0 ) = f(x 1 ) for every f. It is the only rest security definition, in SOA security model, the above restricting of f is not enough since an adversary can learn part information of message by making corrupt query of I. For example, an adversary can make I = {1} query and know m 1 , by using key query to f, it can ). In What we want to emphasize is that the key query and the corrupt query influence each other. The query of keys can increase the knowledge of the adversary, which can affect the choice of I; the corrupt query of I can make the adversary learn more about the message and can affect the choice of functionality f. In our scheme, we impose restrictions on the sequence of of f must be made after the corrupt query of I ) to remove the affect of the key queries, at the same time, on the KeyGen phase we limit the choice of f to remove the affect of the corrupt query on the basis of the opened messages in m[I], because an sary may choose some special f in view of m[I] which can leak the information of
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To solve the second problem, we impose restrictions on the adversary's choice of functions based security definition. To convey the core ideas, it suffices to consider the simple case of X = {0,1}). Suppose that the adversary queries secret keys for function f. security definition guarantees that an adversary cannot differentiate ) for every f. It is the only restriction of security definition, in SOA security model, the above restricting of f is not enough since an adversary can learn part information of message by making corrupt query of I. For g key query to f, it can ,1), it is easy to guess the unopened message m 2 . based security definition. So we make the limitation of of set m[I], which is opened in the corrupt query phase, thus except those messages in m [I] , no matter what other input it is, the value of f is ,···) are equal (··· can be } be any message of message {1,··· ,l} is the query in the SOA-C is mapped
F. We say f is reasonable if
What we want to emphasize is that the key query and the corrupt query influence each other.
of the adversary, which can affect the choice of I; the corrupt query of I can make the adversary learn more about the message and can affect the choice of functionality f. In our scheme, we impose restrictions on the sequence of of f must be made after the corrupt query of I ) to remove the affect of the key queries, at the same time, on the KeyGen phase we limit the choice of f to remove the affect of the corrupt query on the basis of the opened messages in m[I], because an sary may choose some special f in view of m[I] which can leak the information of
PRELIMINARIES
Dec DE. This algorithm takes C and the decryption key skDE as input, and outputs m. Exp DE . This is a PPT algorithm that takes C,m0 as input. Output a fake random r 0 which satisfies EncDE( pk DE , m 0 , r 0 ) = C.
We utilize SW's [3] construction of DE:
Bellare et al. [4] had proved no binding encryption scheme is simulator-based SOA security. That is why we use deniable encryption to realize our scheme. Specially, we use Sahai and Waters' scheme [3] which proposed a construction of deniable encryption. The scheme is proved to be IND-CPA secure and one-bit message encryption by using the technology of puncture, but it is not hard to generalize one-bit to a message string.
Final. The adversary guesses M.
We define the advantage of the adversary in this SO-FE Game:
A functional encryption scheme is secure against SOA if all polynomial time adversaries A have at most a negligible advantage in the Game.
Our scheme is post SO-FE, that is to say, the KeyGen queries of f must be made after the corrupt query of I. There are two reasons to explain why our scheme is asked to be post secure: one is to make sure the adversary choose the set of I without the help of the KeyGen queries. In the proof of the security, the simulator hope to run the adversary and utilize the rewind technology after the corrupt query hIi until the challenge cipher is not contain in I. The other is to make sure there is no leak about information of the challenge plaintext after the adversary receives SKf, because we restricy the choices of functions that can be queried based on I. The Specific reasons can refer to the proof of the security in section 5.
A CONSTRUCTION OF SO-FE
We now give our construction of SO-FE scheme. In fact, our construction is based on that of Table 3 , and output SKf = io(PKeyGen). DecSO−FE: Compute SKf (C).
THE SECURITY OF SO-FE
The SO-FE scheme in section 4 is a SIM-SO FE scheme, the security model is given in section 3. Now we will give the security proof.
Theorem 1.
If io is an indistinguishability obfuscator, DE is IND-CPA security and the NIZK is statistically simulation sound, the scheme is a no-adaptive secure SO-FE.
Proof. In order to prove the FE scheme is SIM-SO security, we need to construct a simulator which can run in the GameSIM to simulate all the possibility in the GameREAL. That is to say, |Pr(GameREAL ⇒ true) − Pr(GameSIM ⇒ true)| ≤ neg(·).
In short, the simulator needs to create equivocable ciphertexts as the challenge ciphertexts, then open them accordingly. Here, we must make sure the equivocable ciphertexts are indistinguishable from the real encryption of the messages in the REAL setting. In order to provide the environment of the adversary in GameREAL, on the corrupt phase, the simulator first gets the corrupt messages from the Oracle in the GameSIM and then outputs the fake randomness which is indistinguishable from the real random used in the encryption to the adversary (here we use the technology of DE).
we proof the theorem through a series of Hybrids: We can see Pr(Hybrid0 ⇒ true) = Pr(GameREAL ⇒ true) Hybrid 1: We define Hybrid 1 to be the same as Hybrid 0, except that on the corrupt phase, the challenger first runs the Oracle in GameSIM to get the message m[I], for i ∈ |I|,α = {a,b}, set sαi ← R, riα = io(PExpα )(mi,ciα ,sαi ). Output r[i] = (ria,rib). (cαi is the cipher generated by simulator, mi is the output of Oracle).
We now say |Pr(Hybrid0 ⇒ true) − Pr(Hybrid1 ⇒ true)| ≤ neg(·), because the random returned in Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 0 are almost identically distributed in the view of A. The indistinguishability between Hybrid0 and Hybrid1 can reduce to the explainability of DE scheme.
In [3] , Sahai and Waters had proved the explainability of deniable encryption: if the io is indistinguishable and F1 is a puncturable extracting PRF, F2 is a puncturable statistically injective PRF, F3 is a general puncturable PRF, then the generated pseudo-randomness is indistinguishable with the real random. While in Hybrid 0, the encrypted randomness is chosen from set {0,1}|r|/S,(S = {(a,b)|a = F 2 (K 2 , F 3 (K 3 ,a) ⊕ b),a = {0,1}|r 1 |,b = {0,1}|r 2 |}). Now we can see the size of S: for any fixed a, there exist at most one preimage a0 because of F2 is a puncturable statistically injective PRF, thus b = a 0 ⊕ F3(K 3 ,a) is well-determined. So |S| = 2|r 1 | and choose a random from S is negligible if r is large enough.
Hybrid 2:
We define Hybrid 2 is the same with Hybrid 1 except that on the KeyGen query phase, the challenger returns is defined as follows). Our scheme is noadaptive security, the KeyGen query is made after the challenge phase. It's easy to see SK[f and SKf is indistinguishable . So |Pr(Hybrid1 ⇒ true)−Pr(Hybrid2 ⇒ true)| ≤ neg(·).
The indistinguishability between Hybrid1 and Hybrid2 can reduce to the indistinguishability of io.
Hybrid 3−p:(0 ≤ p ≤ q) We define Hybrid 3−p is the same with Hybrid 2 except that on the challenge phase, if i ≤ p, we replace the real challenge cipher to new ones which are generate by simulater, ( here specially the simulator choose messages mi = 1n and send the ciphers to A); If p < i ≤ q, the simulate sends the real challenge cipher to A. (2) or (2) and (3), we hope to reduce the problem to the IND-CPA secure DE. That is to say we hope to structure a simulator B who can run A, if there is an A who can distinguish (1) and (2) or (2) and (3), there is an adversary B who can distinguish the challenge cipher c * in Game of IND-CPA DE. The reduction can refer to appendix. So
CONCLUSION
Our paper proposed a stronger security of FE which is secure against SOA and proposed a concrete construction of SO-FE scheme. A lot of work is worth doing in the future, for example, how to concrete a SO-FE without indistinguishability obfuscation. 
B. Indistinguishability Obfuscator

C. NIZK
A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (NIZK) contains three algorithms NIZK = (Setup,Prove,V er): crs ← Setup(1 k );π ← Prove(crs, stmt, ω);b ← V er(crs, stmt, π), where k is the security parameter, crs is the common reference string, stmt is the statement information, ω is a witness and π is the proof, moreover b is 0/1 means rejection or acceptance. In [16] , the FE scheme used statistically simulation sound NIZK, which they called SSS-NIZK, and Garg et al. proposed a concrete construction of SSS-NIKZ. Informally, a NIZK system is statistically simulation sound, if under a simulated crs, there is no valid proof for any false statement, except for the simulated proofs for statements fed into the SimSetup algorithm to generate crs. That is to say, f
Completeness
D. Reduct to IND-CPA DE
Here we will explain the indistinguishability between Hybrid3−(p−1)−(1) and Hybrid3−(p−1)−(2) or Hybrid3−(p−1)−(2) and Hybrid3−(p−1)−(3). We hope to structure a simulator B who can run A, if there is an A who can distinguish (1) and (2) or (2) and (3), there is an adversary B who can distinguish the challenge cipher c * in Game of IND-CPA DE (refer to the following figures). When A make key generate queries hfi(q-bounded): B replaces in the SK[f to decrypt and make sure we can use the key in the second part of the double encryption system. Then send it to A. 
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